Classmates:  These are the notes from a talk given by Marsh Carter and his talk was attended by Wayne Downing.   If you will scroll to the end of this talk, you will find a link to a photo of Marsh and Wayne in the ’62 Room.

 

                                                                                                             

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title:                            “21st Century  Warfighting Tools for the Modern Cadet---Beans, Bullets, Brains and Economics!….Economics???”

 

Speaker:                    Marshall N. Carter

                                    Chairman, New York Stock Exchange

 

 

Audience:                   Cadets majoring in economics or Members of the economic club/forum

 

 

Introduction   

 

                        l         Observations on Leadership

 

 

Main Body

l      Historical Overview

l      Major Economic Trends

l      Resource Constraints

l      Economic Sanctions

l      Effectiveness of Sanctions and Economic Power

 

 

Conclusions

 

l      Key questions for the future


 

                        FINAL 10/4/2005

 

 

“21st Century  Warfighting Tools for the Modern Cadet---

Beans, Bullets, Brains and Economics!….Economics???”

Marshall N. Carter

 

Chairman, New York Stock Exchange

For Cadets at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, November 3, 2005

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

Acknowledge:  General Downing, General Lenox, Cadets, members of the faculty, others.

 

Thank you Colonel Belknap for that introduction.  My father would have been proud, and my mother would have believed it!

 

I was surprised to learn recently that Economics is the most popular major here.   That’s a long way from the late 1950’s when General Downing and I were Cadets and 46 of the 48 courses we took were prescribed by the Dean and the Supe.

 

Last summer, Colonel Belknap, who spent part of her summer on Wall Street, asked me if I would, as Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange and a West Point graduate, give a few observations on global economics.  Observations of a practical sense to accompany the theories you are learning in class.

 

The NYSE is the largest pool of liquidity or financial capital in the world.  At $13 trillion it dwarfs the London, and Tokyo Exchanges and NASDAQ, each under $4 trillion.  There are 2800 major companies traded on the Exchange of which almost 500 are from outside the United States.  About 1.6 billion shares per day are traded for a daily value of $55 billion.  Sitting astride these financial flows gives us an interesting view of the global economy.

 

In addition to this job, which I assumed last April, I was for 10 years the CEO of a specialized bank and trust company in Boston that did business in 94 countries and had under it’s control trillions of dollars of pension and mutual fund assets.   Not bad, for a Cadet Sergeant who got “slugged” first class year for standing on a table to throw a roll across the dining hall!!  I’m sure none of you would be so stupid to do a thing like that, especially 5 months before graduation!

 

Anyway, I’m often asked, because I don’t have an MBA or traditional business background, what leadership and management  techniques have been successful as a CEO and Chairman.  And where did I learn them?   My answer is always direct – I use the same leadership skills I learned at West Point and as a company grade officer in combat.  The difference, now of course, is that I carry on my hip, a cell phone, a blackberry, and a pager instead of a Berretta pistol!!

 

Since entering here as plebes you have been acquiring skills that are rapidly becoming part of your DNA, your operating style, and your future.

 

So regardless of whether you devote your life, and it is a way of life, not a job, to a military career, which we all hope you’ll do, or choose other avenues, these are the traits that will mark you, and the ones I have used successfully:

 

l   Leadership – the acts of getting men and women to accomplish tasks they can’t do alone.  I prefer leadership with no self-aggrandizing and as you’ll find out as a company grade officer, unit accomplishment is the thing to focus on. 

 

l  Ethics  - Defined here as a set of principles of right conduct and the standards governing the conduct of members of a profession.  You are members of a profession with very strong ethics. You can’t learn this in an academic course, as many colleges try to tell you.  You have to live it day-by-day.  As evidenced by the problems in the business community the past few years, many CEO’s did not.  Of course, in the military the penalty for bad ethics, bad or false reporting, dubious trustworthiness, is that often men and women are killed or wounded.

           

l   Multi-Tasking – You’ve been learning this since Beast Barracks and plebe year when studying while shining equipment or doing other things was routine.  Once you’re commissioned, it becomes a critical skill at all levels but especially lieutenants and captains.  I can instantly recall as a 26 year old infantry company commander during my first tour in Vietnam, leading the company during an assault while talking to the 4 platoon leaders, my mortar section leader, the artillery FO, forward air controllers, helicopter gunships, thinking about re-supply, and occasionally reporting to my battalion commander.  That’s the ultimate multi-tasking, and it’s not a skill I see often in business.

 

l   Finally, an Ability to Prioritize  - to determine what’s mission critical, what decisions need to be made today versus those that don’t impact immediate operations.  Again, another skill I don’t see often outside the military.

 

These are the skills I started learning here.  But, enough “free advice” from a grad whose war was over 30 years ago!  Let’s talk about economics, and there will be a time for questions in a few minutes.

 

MAIN BODY

 

With regard to economics, your main academic focus, first;

 

l      An Historical Overview.  As we look back over the past few centuries, we see:

 

-         1800’s – a period of nation building, creation of colonial empires, territorial expansion; regional economic impacts rather than global.  Most trade and financial dealings were bilateral.  Wars were fought between armies in the field.  Economics did play a role in the Civil War; three examples that show how economics, not just trade, was beginning to emerge as a major force.

                                   

1.   Cotton and the British Economy

 

         In 1861, 80% of British cotton imports came from Confederate states and the textile industry was the leading British, as well as French, industry.  As the Union naval blockade became effective there was widespread unemployment in France and Britain as hundreds of textile mills shut down.

 

         As late as 1863, Confederate hopes were based in part upon British and French intervention to stop the war and recognize Confederate legitimacy, thus ensuring Confederate success in creating an independent nation.   The Confederacy so strongly believed in the economic influence and importance of “King Cotton” diplomacy that they imposed a self-embargo early in the war hoping to drive up global demand and prices in an effort to gain allies.  Once the Confederates realized the economic necessity of selling cotton on the world market, the Union blockage was too tight to export in quantity.

 

 

2.     Sherman’s March Across Georgia

 

        

         Another interesting Civil War economic event was General William Tecumseh Sherman’s, (Class of 1840) plans to destroy the economic base of the Confederacy.  His theory, according to several biographers, was that the killing of Confederate soldiers could go on for years, and the war wouldn’t necessarily be won until the South’s economic and industrial ability to support their Army with horses, food, uniforms and materiel was destroyed.

 

 

        

         He had a difficult time convincing his bosses, General Grant and President Lincoln, that this strategy, probably one of the earliest uses of a “total war” concept to include economic factors, would be effective in shortening the conflict.   While Sherman’s March to the Sea certainly imposed economic hardships on the South, it also targeted the Confederate’s will to fight.

 

3.     Shenandoah Valley

 

         Another example is Union General Phil Sheridan’s 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign.  Sheridan, Class of 1853, recognized the importance of the Shenandoah as the “breadbasket of the Confederacy,” and his 1864 campaign sought to destroy all forage, provisions, and stocks in the area to force Southerners to depart the valley.  Sheridan’s goal and famous quote was, “that a crow flying over the valley would have to carry his own rations.”  I guess the crow hadn’t heard of MREs!

 

-         1900’s  - periods of territorial expansion by dictators, wars fought less for economic than ideological reasons, although you could probably make a case that one of the “triggers” to WWII was the July 1941 halting of American oil exports to Japan, a nation even then, totally dependent upon oil imports. In the late 1930’s, it imported 90% of its oil, 80% from the U.S.  The United States, to demonstrate its disapproval of Japanese aggressiveness in Asia stopped all US exports, which made conflict inevitable.  This is no way “credits” economics with starting the war with Japan, but it is an example of how economics play a role in national ambitions.  For Japan to try to reach its territorial and national conquest goals in 1941, it had to have oil, rubber and other commodities, such as tin.  It could get these from the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia, but only if the American Naval fleet was eliminated.  In this situation I would say that Japan’s national goal dictated their economic policy.

 

-  Late 1900’s

 

From the end of WWII until the early 1990’s, we had as a national strategic concept, the containment of communism by all means, military, political, social, and economic.  There are several interesting examples of economic power being very effective in helping this containment.  

 

From the end of World War II until the mid 1980’s, the USSR had as a national objective, militarily matching all threats, favoring military spending versus domestic and supporting its Communist allies with money and equipment.  This objective combined with nine failed “Five Year Plans” to boost its domestic economy, severely overburdened that economy, which was antiquated with no real infrastructure.

 

I can remember in 1975, while working at the State Department, seeing satellite photographs of the Russian corn crop.  Less than 50 miles from Moscow, farmers using horses and mules to harvest.  In fact, after two bad harvests in the 1971-75 economic plan, the USSR had to import massive grain shipments and severely depleted her gold reserves to do so.    American intelligence sources knew more about their grain crops than the centralized government.  This knowledge was then used in limiting the Canadian and US grain exports as an economic “weapon” to bring about changes in Russian international behavior.  Secretary Kissinger argued that the U.S. grain crop was a tremendous asset, mainly because there was no substitute for it in the world.  He believed appropriately managed sales could buy a year or so of good Soviet behavior.  He cited the skill with which the OPEC nations used their oil resources, urged that the administration maintain an “element of uncertainty,” and cautioned against excessive eagerness in dealing with the Soviets. The interesting and practical aspects of this was that Russia, our avowed enemy during the Cold War, was actually selling strategic minerals to get hard cash to buy grain and pay for other imports.   Minerals such as chromium ore (also germanium and indium) were sold on the world market knowing full well that these exports were probably going to the U.S. for our strategic metals stockpile for defense use.  Often countries trade and export/import business will be kept separate from their ideological or international relations.  Here, the USSR’s need for hard currency, and economic concern, dictated their international actions.

 

In 1985 under Gorbachev, the Soviets underwent a radical shift to a military policy of “reasonable sufficiency” from matching all threats.  The new Soviet thinking saw security in a nuclear world as mutual, and indeed saw influence in an interdependent economic world as based upon technological and economic capability, rather than military might, as demonstrated by the growing economic power of Japan and Germany.

 

While it may be a stretch to credit President Reagan’s Star Wars Initiative, as some have, with hastening or even causing the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no doubt that 50 years of failed economic plans, failure to modernize basic industries, failure to provide adequate agricultural output caused a reappraisal of Soviet national economic objectives away from pure military power when confronted with matching U.S. initiatives.

 

Here, unlike Japan, we have an economy and its failure dictating a change in national policy.  That’s the world of practical global economics.

 

-         2000’s – as we look forward in this century, and a large number of you will live to see the latter years of this century, there are a number of economic trends that will have a significant impact on your careers.

 

One trend, which I won’t cover in detail is the aging of populations in most European and many Asian countries.  A baby girl, born today in an industrialized nation, has a 1 in 3 chance to live to 100.  This aging process and the economic power necessary to provide for healthcare, employment and retirement will have a profound effect on your lives, and the economic growth and welfare of many nations.  

 

(Anecdote:     Picture this – it’s June, week 2080, you are the oldest living grad, they wheel you out in a non-polluting hydrogen powered portable person device, and you hear a Firstie in ranks say, “she’s the oldest living graduate and she actually fought in Iraq with a rifle”.  During June week when General Downing and I were yearlings, the oldest living grad was from a class in the 1880’s and he had actually fought against the Plains Indians, needless to say the Corps went wild when he was wheeled out as reviewing officer!!

 

Major Economic Trends

 

These are the economic trends for this century that seem critical to me:

 

            First:  we are entering a time of global resource constraints – it took over 100 years for the world to use the first 1 trillion barrels of oil.  At the current rate of consumption, 84 million barrels per day, we will use the second trillion in the next 30 years.  With two economies, India and China growing rapidly and with over 2 billion people (37% of world population) between them we will see increasing competition for resources.  The nation’s that have these resources are often not large enough to use them totally and need the export revenue to maintain balanced and growing economies.

 

What does resource constraint mean to our economy and, more importantly to you as part of our national defense structure?

 

The world’s current and prospective largest oil importing nations will continue to compete to ensure sufficient supplies to meet their needs.  The attempt last summer by China’s state-owned oil company to buy Unocal and China’s new interest in Africa illustrates the larger struggle:

 

·    Japan and China are in an increasingly keen competition for oil supplies.  This is particularly apparent in and around the disputed waters of the East China Sea.

 

 

·    Japan ranks second only to the United States in its consumption of crude oil, which amounts to about 5.4 million barrels per day.

 

·    Chinese oil usage rose almost 40% in the first half of 2004, and this accounted for roughly one-third of the increase in total world oil consumption, although it has rich coal deposits, its economy is increasingly based on oil much of which must be imported.

 

·    To meet such demands, it will be necessary for all countries to both boost their energy efficiency, which is becoming a matter of national strategic advantage or vulnerability, and to secure energy supplies from more and more difficult sources.  Difficult means remote extraction and non-friendly locations.

 

·    The competitive importance of oil underlies the bidding war last summer between U.S. and Chinese oil companies over Unocal Corp.

 

·    Unocal is known as an expert at drilling wells, some as deep as nearly 10 km under the crust of the Earth.  That, along with its portfolio of prime deep-water-drilling leases, helps explain why both CNOOC, the China National Oil Company and Chevron Corp. were willing to spend billions of dollars for the company.   Additionally, Taiwan gets a large percentage of its natural gas from UNOCAL fields in Indonesia.  If CNOOC owned UNOCAL, would they have the ability to unilaterally cut off Taiwan’s supplies?  Here again, economic factors are linked to national goals and vice versa.

 

More broadly, the long-run scarcity and importance of energy is arguably only beginning to be reflected in prices, although it is widely recognized as a national security issue.

 

·    The current price of light crude oil recently went over $60 a barrel, with gas at the pump up significantly to over $4.00.

 

·    If we take 1980s oil prices, however, and adjust them for inflation, we calculate that, just to keep oil prices constant in real terms, the current price per barrel would have to be something around $80.

 

·    In other words, prices have gone through a period of not keeping up with inflation, and looking forward they could rise a lot more.

 

·    If the oil price adjustments were always smooth, they would be much less of a problem.  Unfortunately, price shocks are ugly and hard to predict.  Like earthquakes, their probability quietly increases over periods of time when there is calm and complacency can set in.

 

·    The 1970s Arab and Iranian oil and gas embargoes contributed to US interest rates reaching as high as 20% and inflation at double-digit levels.  The disruption to US industry resulted in severe economic recessions with record unemployment.  The government tried to ameliorate these effects with price controls and new regulations, although these attempts met with mixed success.

 

·    Viewed from the perspective of the overall economic costs of such an event, it appears well worth substantial national planning and investments to guard against these in the future –in energy saving investments, in technologies, in defense, and in expanding import/export agreements.

 

Going forward, it is likely that the risks of such scenarios to include confrontation will increase:

 

·    According to some sources by 2030 world energy consumption will expand by almost 60%. 

 

·    Major oil-and-gas importing countries, including industrialized countries, and fast-growing developing countries, such as China and India, will become more dependent on imports from distant, and often politically unstable parts of the world.

 

·    China and India today, with a combined population of 2.4 billion, represent 37% of the total world population.  By 2050, these two countries will have a combined population of 3.0 billion people, or 33% of the world total.

 

·    Moreover, almost all growth in energy production also will come from non-European countries, primarily Middle Eastern members of OPEC and Russia.

 

·    There are several consequences of supply constraints:  vulnerability to supply disruptions will increase as international trade expands.  Climate-destabilizing carbon-dioxide emissions will continue to rise.  Huge amounts of new energy infrastructure will need to be financed.

 

·    In other words, energy imbalances in remote or less developed parts of the world, where U.S. influence may not be as strong, will continue to have the potential to directly affect and even disrupt our lives here in America.

 

·    From a political, economic, and military viewpoint, a central key question is how the US can assure that it does not get squeezed out or disrupted.

 

 

 

            Second Trend:  As the Cold War ended, we entered a period where the world began to shift from a defense and political orientation to an economic, trade and business focus.

 

            Please Note – I don’t ignore the current global terrorism challenges, I’m just not sure where it goes yet.   Clearly there is an economic, or perhaps a “lack of  opportunity” challenge for young people in many countries which makes them vulnerable to destructive ideologies. 

 

l      Economics:  If we accept these two trends, resource constraints and the increased importance of economic power then does it follow that a knowledge of economics, economic power and the ability and national will to use this power globally, can or will become an even more important tool in a nation’s international stature?  While economic power can be an effective tool it doesn’t seem to me that it will ever replace actual force projection or the threat or capability for force projections.

 

My answer is YES, BUT, the “but” reflects the changing nature of the global economy and the difficulty in actually making economic power effective and useful in keeping the peace or furthering national goals.

 

l   Economic Sanctions.   In the broadest sense, an economic sanction is any action by a nation or group of nations, to deliberately alter, withdraw, terminate established international trade or financial dealings.  The purposes range from forcing a targeted country to stop military action, abandon plans for territorial acquisitions, impair the economic capacity of the country thereby forcing curtailment of some activity or force a change in policies.

 

      Some of the more successful were US actions to stop British-French-Israeli actions in seizing the Suez Canal in 1956 and recent UN actions to change the conduct of Libya.  One of the least successful has been North Korea.

 

 

      Suez 1956

 

      In 1956 the Egyptian government nationalized and seized the Suez Canal.  France, Britain and Israel attacked to seize the Canal.  They based their actions on their publicly stated purpose of protecting continued use of this vital international waterway.

 

      What would it have been like to be a paratrooper lieutenant in the British airborne units?  Let’s look.

 

     

      It’s mid-October 1956, you’re a lieutenant in the 3rd Parachute Battalion (Red Devils of WWII fame).  Your unit is alerted for a combat jump.  You’ve never seen combat, you’ve had some “police duties” in Cyprus, but all you ever hear about from the field grade officers is WWII, Korea, and how your generation won’t amount to much because you’ve never been in combat.  (That’s what General Downing and I heard in 1964-65, who knew then the war would last 10 years and we would each spend over 2 years there).  The assault is on, and on November 5 you make a combat jump onto an airfield in Port Said, Egypt, the northern terminus of the Suez Canal.  After brief fire fights and a dozen or so casualties, the battalion seizes the airfield and moves to seize the major port facilities to facilitate a seaborne landing of heavy units scheduled for the next day.  But, on November 7 a ceasefire is ordered.  A ceasefire, a three day war, what’s that all about?  You have a suspicion it’s related to economics because you had reports of gasoline shortages at home, and the pound sterling has dropped in value.

 

      Some economic facts;  First,  Britain and France had not fully recovered from WWII, and their economies were dependent upon U.S. assistance.  Second, of 70 million tons of oil passing through the Canal, 60 million went to Western Europe and an alternate route of not using the Canal would have required twice as many ships which neither country had.  Third, President Eisenhower had warned the British and French that for the U.S., the use of military force to seize the Canal was unacceptable and action by the United Nations was favored.   Eisenhower then took action to not provide support for the British pound sterling, to not allow Export Import loans to purchase oil and to prohibit loans from the International Monetary Fund.  These actions would have brought the British and French economies to their knees and they had no choice but to agree to a ceasefire and the introduction of United Nations peacekeepers.  In this case, economic pressure worked because of the extreme vulnerability of the British and French economies and the economic power of the U.S.

 

      Libya, 1996 to Present.  In order to curtail Libya’s ability to give financial backing to terrorism, economic sanctions were implemented by the US and the UN in 1996.  They specifically impacted oil technologies, military equipment and aviation related exports and imports, and financial dealings related to those.  From Libya’s current conduct it appears that the combined affect was positive.  U.S. sanctions were lifted after Gadafi renounced the development of weapons of mass destruction, allowed weapons inspectors to verify that his country was abandoning nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and accepted responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 at Lockerbie, Scotland.  In effect, Libya wanted to become an accepted member of the international economic community by modifying its behavior and the many years of sanctions worked. 

 

l   Effectiveness as an Economic Technique  

 

      The current global economy has characteristics such as fungible commodities, speed of funds/money transfers, internet, that work against economic pressure because there are so many alternative ways to conduct financial transactions.   A key factor is that large country economies are interdependent and the magnitude of trade has created co-dependencies, thereby making sanctions a 2-edged sword with substantial domestic policy impacts.

     

      The U.S., alone and in concert with other nations, has used economic sanctions in support of foreign policy goals dozens and dozens of times in the past 100 years.  Some have worked, many have not.  The effectiveness of sanctions must be evaluated in terms of whether other alternatives were available and the timeframe.  For example, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the time for economic sanctions to influence Iraqi behavior was long gone  -- force projection was necessary! 

 

      In the case of North Korea, sanctions and restrictions on trade are designed to influence their attempts to develop nuclear weapons.  Given almost daily news reports these seem to have failed.  Why?  For the following reasons:

 

1)         They have a subsistence level economy so economic sanctions would take years to have an impact.

 

2)         They have a long border with a country, China, that is not always acting in the best interests of the West.

 

3)         Transhipment of goods through third or fourth countries or the international blackmarket allows essentials to reach to the country or be exported from North Korea.

 

What can we say about sanctions and their power to influence a countries actions:

 

1)         They seem to work best when the imposing powers act in concert to bring real pressure on the target economy.

 

2)         They work best when there is real economic leverage such as Suez, Libya but not North Korea.

 

3)         They are increasingly difficult in the 21st Century because of the blackmarket in many goods such as uranium and nuclear technology.

 

4)         The “law of unintended consequences” may apply!  For example, if the US applied sanctions on agricultural products/exports and a large sector of the US farm community say soy bean growers were impacted there would be concern in Congress.  Or too tight a set of economic sanctions on North Korea could force them to believe they had no choice, but to invade the South.   When the U.S. reduced grain exports in 1979 to Russia to protest the invasion of Afghanistan, it had a bad impact on American farmers because they had been providing 78% of Russian imports.  You can imagine the protests of middle America’s Congressional delegations and their demand for alternative action.

 

CONCLUSION

 

Let me sum up by saying that I’ve painted a mixed picture here, economic power can be powerful, but often difficult to make effective.  So, what’s the impact upon you and why is it important to understand the practical side of economic theory?  Rather than answer that directly, let me pose a set of questions about your future for you to ponder.  Lots of topics for the dreaded term paper here!  These relate to the practical, real world of global economics that are of interest as a complement to your formal economics courses.   These are not new and have appeared in various newspapers, magazines and journals.

 

l         ECONOMICS

 

1.         If economics is powerful, effective and useful, what’s the implications for military force structure and the organization of the Army and other services?  Do we/will we need more practical economists and less war fighters?

 

2.         Is force projection through economic power really a viable alternative to “boots on the ground”?  Do we ever have the luxury of time to wait until economic sanctions work?

 

3.         What does a shift in the economic center of gravity of the world from the US/Europe regions towards Asia mean for the U.S.?  China, Korea, Japan now account for 25% of the world’s population and 18% of global GDP.   Last year, India and China accounted for 6% of the worlds GDP versus 28% for the U.S.  but this ratio is expected to grow, and by 2050 China and India will be 42% versus 26% for the U.S. with China alone at 28%.   After 60 years of US-Europe focus can we adjust?  How?

 

4)         Clearly, U.S. policy is now partially driven by a need for energy resources.  Why can’t we seem to promote conservation and alternative energy and power sources?   Why 30 years after the oil shortages of the mid-1970’s are we more dependent upon oil imports?

 

l         China questions:

 

 1.        Balancing our relations to an emerging economic powerhouse and growing military power, how do we do that?   Can we continue to keep economic and military / political issues separate?

 

  2.       In China who will prevail, the military hawks or the economic modernists?  A recent New York Times article postulated that the latter see China joining the U.S. as the second global economic power with the two nations sharing the gains from increased trade and global growth. The hawks view America as having a policy to remain the only superpower and keep China from becoming a global rather than just a regional power. 

 

3.         How do we deal with Chinese companies purporting to be part of the global economy but actually controlled by the government (UNOCAL purchase).  This issue is getting widespread attention.  Quote from Foreign Affairs magazine of the Council on Foreign Relations:

 

             “Chinese foreign policy is now driven by China’s unprecedented need for resources.  In exchange for access to oil and other raw materials to fuel its booming economy, Beijing has boosted its bilateral relations with resource-rich states, sometimes striking deals with rogue governments or treading on U.S. turf.”

 

l         India questions:  

 

1.         Without population controls, can they grow their economy to match their population growth? 

 

2.         What are their global and regional aspirations?  

 

l         Economic sanctions. 

 

1.         Sanctions on trade and financial dealings between countries have been used since the Peloponnesian War in 432 B.C. but are they still an effective policy for this century?  Is the global economy too complex with too many alternative sources of money and goods?

 

Thank you.  We do have time for questions, and they don’t have to be limited to economics.

 

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Marsh and Wayne in the '62 Room.